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The Origins of the Interventionist State in 
France, 1830–1870*
The Revolution of 1789 presaged a renewal of economic interventionism 
on the part of the French state. With the assault on the Church, the state 
assumed increasing responsibility for poor relief, and it continued the 
commitment to public works that had existed under the Ancien Régime. 
The Revolutionary regimes of the 1790s, however, lacked the means 
to fulfil the economic responsibilities they envisioned for the state. 
The overhaul of the tax system after 1789 starved local government of 
resources. The central government, too, struggled to raise money, as its 
attempts to meet the costs of European war in the 1790s exacerbated an 
inflationary crisis. The Napoleonic regime established in 1799, though 
it did much to develop the legal framework of the interventionist state, 
also found its resources consumed by the escalating costs of the ‘total 
wars’ of 1792–1815.1 Not until the late 1830s did government spending 
on public works begin seriously to increase.
It is the contention of this article that the July Monarchy of 1830 to 1848, 
often neglected by historians, marked a new stage in the development of 
the interventionist state that has been a persistent characteristic of French 
economic history. Historians have tended to regard the July Monarchy 
as the most ‘laissez-faire’ and Anglophile of France’s nineteenth-century 
regimes, and thus as the most committed to the notion of a limited, 
‘liberal’ state.2 Yet even in nineteenth-century Britain and the United 
States, supposedly paragons of laissez-faire, the state retained a crucial 
role in regulating and shaping the market.3 Taxation, the law and political 
institutions all affected economic activity. Indeed, the laissez-faire British 
were more heavily taxed than the French for most of the nineteenth 
century.4 Moreover, as Patrick O’Brien and Caglar Keyder have suggested, 
it is ‘not at all obvious that the path of economic development taken by 
* I am very grateful to Robert Tombs, Martin Daunton and David Todd for their comments 
on drafts of this article, in addition to the journal’s referees and the editor, Peter Marshall, for 
many helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2017-007) and the 
AHRC for the financial support that allowed me to research and write this article.
1. See J.  Horn, The Path Not Taken: French Industrialization in the Age of Revolution 
(Cambridge, MA, 2006); D.A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of 
Modern Warfare (London, 2007).
2. See, for example, G.P. Palmade, Capitalisme et capitalistes français au XIXe siècle (Paris, 
1961), pp. 106–20, 129.
3. M. Daunton, State and Market in Victorian Britain: War, Welfare and Capitalism 
(Woodbridge, 2008), esp. pp. 4–6; J. Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British 
Politics and Culture, 1800–1870 (London, 2006); W.J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and 
Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), pp. 83–113.
4. A. Plessis, ‘L’Impôt des français au XIXe siècle, remplacé dans une perspective européenne’, 
in M. Lévy-Leboyer, M. Lescure and A. Plessis, eds., L’Impôt en France aux XIXe et XXe siècles 
(Paris, 2006), p. 24.
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Page 2 of 31 THE INTERVENTIONIST STATE IN FRANCE
France from 1780 to 1914 was inferior to the vaunted British model’; the per 
capita growth rate of commodity output in both countries was quite similar 
throughout the nineteenth century.5 Thus, the economic consequences 
of French state activity may need to be reappraised. As François Jarrige 
has observed, the notion of an overbearing French state stifling economic 
development with excessive bureaucracy, taxes and regulation is largely 
a myth.6 A recent revision of Ancien Régime interventionism has argued 
that it was not necessarily either oppressive or counterproductive;7 and, 
while the sluggish growth of the late nineteenth century did coincide 
with a period of rising state intervention, the ascent of the interventionist 
Orleanist state in the 1830s and 1840s occurred during a period of above-
average economic growth.8 Indeed, this economic expansion, and the 
social transformation that ensued, made the 1840s, in David Pinkney’s 
words, ‘decisive years in France’.9
Recent work on trade has challenged the notion of a ‘liberal’ 
Orleanist regime that held aloof from economic affairs, emphasising the 
growth of protectionism from the mid-1830s onwards.10 However, the 
most striking form of state interventionism was a wave of government 
spending and new regulation directed at public works, particularly 
railways, which historians have tended to disregard. While scholars such 
as Louis Fontvieille and Pierre Rosanvallon have noted the ‘massive 
assistance’ and ‘decisive impulsion’ the July Monarchy gave to railway 
construction, this was more original than they suggest.11 Analysing the 
justifications given for the Orleanist state’s interventionism, Rosanvallon 
claims that it largely reflected that of the Ancien Régime. This, however, 
does not do justice to the scale of the Orleanist state’s public works 
spending, which markedly exceeded that of previous regimes (fig.  1). 
That the state could find the means to raise railway expenditure to such 
a level was all the more impressive in the light of the growth of military 
spending in the 1840s, not least because of the costs of conquering 
Algeria. As a result, central government expenditure increased in real 
5. P. O’Brien and C. Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780–1914: Two Paths to 
the Twentieth Century (London, 1978), p. 196.
6. E. Fureix and F. Jarrige, La Modernité désenchantée: Relire l’ histoire du XIXe siècle français 
(Paris, 2015), pp. 295–6. For a typical summary of the economic drag supposedly caused by the 
French state, see, for example, R. Cameron, ‘Economic Growth and Stagnation in France, 1815–
1914’, in B.E. Supple, ed., The Experience of Economic Growth: Case Studies in Economic History 
(New York, 1963), pp. 336–8.
7. P. Minard, La Fortune du colbertisme: État et industrie dans la France des lumières 
(Paris, 1998).
8. F. Crouzet, ‘French Economic Growth in the Nineteenth Century Reconsidered’, History, 
lix (1974), pp. 170–71; H. Sée, La Vie économique de la France sous la monarchie censitaire (1815–
1848) (Paris, 1927), pp. 32–43, 67–70. For a critique of the argument that the state hindered growth 
at the end of the century, see M. Lévy-Leboyer and F. Bourguignon, L’Économie française au XIXe 
siècle: Analyse macro-économique (Paris, 1985), pp. 81–91.
9. D.H. Pinkney, Decisive Years in France, 1840–1847 (Princeton, NJ, 1986).
10. D. Todd, Free Trade and Its Enemies in France, 1814–1851 (Cambridge, 2015).
11. L. Fontvieille, Évolution et croissance de l’État Français: 1815–1969 (Paris, 1976), p.  1685; 
P. Rosanvallon, L’État en France de 1789 à nos jours (Paris, 1990), pp. 219–21.
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terms by 51 per cent between 1830 and 1847 (fig.  2)—though, given 
economic growth, this remained at around 10 per cent of GDP.12
As Rosanvallon’s analysis suggests, historians have not fully 
appreciated the innovative quality of Orleanist public spending, seeing 
the regime as largely continuing the limited interventionism of its 
Restoration predecessor. Surveying the period 1815–1848, Tom Kemp 
has concluded that ‘[French] government policy was narrow and 
parsimonious ... Government did not promote economic growth, but 
through sound finance and protection kept it within narrowly defined 
Figure 1. Central government expenditure on public works, 1815–1870 
(millions of francs, at 1815 prices). Source: Fontvieille, Évolution et croissance, 
pp. 2108–16.
12. Proposition de loi pour le règlement définitif du budget de l’exercice 1830 (Paris, 1832); Projet 
de loi portant règlement définitif du budget de l’exercice 1847 (Paris, 1849); J.-C. Toutain, ‘Le 
produit intérieur brut de la France, 1789–1990’, Économies et Sociétés, series Histoire économique 
quantitative (1997), pp. 5–136.
Figure 2. Central government expenditure, 1815–1870 (millions of francs, at 
1815 prices). Source: Fontvieille, Évolution et croissance, pp. 2108–16.
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limits.’13 Historians of Belgium and, to a lesser extent, of German 
states such as Prussia and Saxony have detected a trend of rising state 
interventionism to promote economic development from the 1830s 
onwards, even if in Prussia politics restrained the growth of public 
expenditure until after 1848.14 But historians of France have often 
adopted a different chronology. Several accounts of the modern French 
state’s economic interventionism only begin in the late nineteenth 
century.15 For Kemp and others, the Second Empire, established in 
1852, did much to instigate the interventionism of the post-Napoleonic 
French state, which was spurred by the advent of universal suffrage in 
1848.16 Indeed, for some scholars, the socio-economic transformation 
produced by the growth of industrial capitalism in the 1850s and 1860s 
marked ‘the birth of modern France’.17 Christopher Clark has recently 
applied a similar chronology to Europe more generally, arguing that 
the 1848 revolutions prompted a series of political, constitutional and 
administrative reforms across the continent—a ‘European revolution 
in government’—which entailed greater economic interventionism.18
In reappraising the political economy of the July Monarchy, this 
article will highlight the similarities in economic policy between the 
July Monarchy and the Second Empire: the Bonapartist regime was 
less innovative than historians have suggested. Both regimes pursued 
similar visions of economic interventionism, though, as we shall see, the 
Second Empire in the 1850s relied more on private finance to undertake 
public works than on the model of state expenditure developed under 
the July Monarchy. Following René Rémond’s influential tripartite 
13. T. Kemp, Economic Forces in French History (London, 1971), p. 134.
14. R. Tilly, ‘The Political Economy of Public Finance and the Industrialization of Prussia, 
1815–1866’, Journal of Economic History, xxvi (1966), pp. 484–97; J.M. Brophy, Capitalism, Politics 
and Railroads in Prussia, 1830–1870 (Columbus, OH, 1998), pp. 36–49; E.D. Brose, ‘The Political 
Economy of Early Industrialisation in German Europe, 1800–1840’, in J. Horn, L.N. Rosenbrand 
and M.R. Smith, eds., Reconceptualizing the Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 2010), 
pp. 107–23; P. Schöller, ‘La Transformation économique de la Belgique de 1832 à 1844’, Bulletin 
de l’Institut des Recherches Économiques et Sociales, xiv, no. 3/5 (1948), pp. 525–96; E. Witte, ‘La 
Construction de la Belgique (1828–1847)’, in E. Witte, É. Gubin, J.-P. Nandrin and G. Deneckere, 
Nouvelle histoire de la Belgique, I: 1830–1905 (Brussels, 2005), pp. 125–44.
15. See, for example, R. Delorme and C. André, L’État et l’ économie: Un essai d’explication 
de l’ évolution des dépenses publiques en France (1870–1980) (Paris, 1983); P.  Fridenson and 
A.  Straus, eds., Le Capitalisme français 19e–20e siècle: Blocages et dynamismes d’une croissance 
(Paris, 1987). Adeline Daumard has conceived the period 1815–1880 as one of a ‘liberal’ state in 
France, largely content to regulate the economy through the law instead of engaging in more 
overt intervention: A. Daumard, ‘L’État libéral et le libéralisme économique’, in P. Léon, M. Lévy-
Leboyer, A. Armengaud et al., Histoire économique et sociale de la France, III: L’Avènement de l’ ère 
industrielle (1789–années 1880) (2 vols, Paris, 1976), i. 137–59.
16. Kemp, Economic Forces in French History, pp. 155–216; Palmade, Capitalisme et capitalistes, 
pp.  128–31; A.  Gueslin, L’État, l’ économie et la société française, XIXe–XXe siècle (Paris, 1992), 
pp. 78–9; X. Lafrance, The Making of Capitalism in France: Class Structures, Economic Development, 
the State and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1750–1914 (Leiden, 2019).
17. A. Plessis, The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852–1871, tr. J. Mandelbaum (Cambridge, 
1987), p. 58; A. Dansette, Naissance de la France moderne: Le Second Empire (Paris, 1976).
18. C. Clark, ‘After 1848: The European Revolution in Government’, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 6th ser., xxii (2012), pp. 171–97.
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conception of the French right, scholars have typically seen Orleanism 
and Bonapartism as divergent traditions—the former supposedly 
invested in laissez-faire and the latter committed to state action—but 
this divergence is not apparent in political economy.19 The growth 
of government expenditure on railways was supported by leading 
Orleanist politicians who, despite historians’ claims to the contrary, 
were as committed as their Bonapartist successors to the interventionist 
state. The similarity between the Orleanists and Bonapartists, and the 
novelty of the July Monarchy’s interventionism, is thrown into sharper 
relief by comparison with the Restoration regime of 1815–1830. It is 
with the Restoration, therefore, that we begin, before turning to the 
Orleanist state itself and then finally to its Bonapartist successor.
I
The system of public credit that facilitated the emergence of a more 
interventionist state from the late 1830s was a creation of the Restoration. 
Under Napoleon, public credit was limited; while the Empire sought to 
maintain the price of government rentes, capital flight during the 1790s 
had left the financial system fragile.20 Napoleonic finance, therefore, 
had relied heavily on plundering conquered territories, which, between 
1802 and 1814, covered 41 per cent of the French budget.21 Napoleon’s 
defeat ended French access to these resources, and, in order to finance 
the reparations imposed by the victorious allies, the French government 
borrowed, thus founding a new system of public credit.22 As in Britain, 
bankers were invited to bid for government loans and the rentes were 
sold to the highest bidder, who then floated them to investors.
The principles that governed the management of this system of 
public credit reflected a distinct British influence. The Ancien Régime 
had collapsed under the weight of its debt, which had contributed to 
financial chaos in the 1790s. The success of British wartime borrowing 
from 1792 to 1815 offered a reminder of the potential value of an 
effective system of public credit, but at the same time the memory 
of the Revolution pushed elites towards fiscal probity. Consequently, 
public debt was to be kept minimal; as Jacques Laffitte, the banker 
and politician, put it in his memoirs, ‘The first means of credit, and 
19. R. Rémond, La Droite en France de la première Restauration à la V e République (3rd edn, 2 
vols, Paris, 1967), vol. i, esp. pp. 105–8.
20. P. Branda, Le Prix de la gloire: Napoléon et l’argent (Paris, 2007), pp. 373–89.
21. P. Branda, ‘La Guerre a-t-elle payé la guerre?’, in T. Lentz, ed., Napoléon et l’Europe: Regards 
sur une politique (Paris, 2005), pp. 270–71.
22. B. Gille, La Banque et le crédit en France de 1815 à 1848 (Paris, 1959), pp. 161–71; J. Greenfield, 
‘Financing a New Order: The Payment of Reparations by Restoration France, 1817–1818’, French 
History, xxx (2016), pp.  376–400. See also M. Flandreau and J.H. Flores, ‘Bonds and Brands: 
Foundations of Sovereign Debt Markets, 1820–1830’, Journal of Economic History, lxix (2009), 
pp. 646–84.
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perhaps the most effective, consists of reducing a large deficit.’23 Aside 
from the loans to finance the reparations, Restoration governments 
borrowed principally to finance an aggressive foreign policy in the 
1820s, as the French intervened militarily in Spain, Greece and Algeria. 
In this way, debt allowed the government to increase spending without 
having to raise taxes—in contrast to Napoleon, whose tax increases 
had compromised the legitimacy of the Empire.24 British-style public 
borrowing, therefore, facilitated the stabilisation of the fiscal system 
after 1815.
Given the commitment to fiscal equilibrium during the Restoration, 
government expenditure on public works was limited. Being focused 
on the military, the Napoleonic regime had spent relatively little on 
infrastructure; by 1814, France’s roads and canals were in serious need 
of investment.25 To minimise the borrowing required to fund public 
works, the government in the 1820s turned to private finance, leasing a 
series of canal concessions to companies of bankers. Even this was done 
on a limited scale. Laffitte, the architect of France’s initial experiments 
in joint-stock finance, had proposed in 1821 to establish a vast joint-
stock company to fund the construction of the French canal network, 
capitalised at 250 million francs—an unprecedented size. Doubtful 
that this scheme would work, and hoping to maintain competition 
between bankers, the government rejected the proposal.26 Moreover, as 
the interior minister observed in 1825, ‘Every day reveals ... the validity 
of the reasons that induced the Administration to proceed at first with 
caution, and not to deploy instantly too great an apparatus of works. If 
it had suddenly offered speculators a considerable array of enterprises, it 
would have inevitably produced an increase in the costs of salaries and 
raw materials, the effects of which would also be felt in the transactions 
of individuals.’27 More to the point, higher construction costs would 
have increased the burden on the state which, in order to secure the 
financiers’ participation, was to cover expenses that exceeded the sums 
originally agreed with the concessionaires.28 The scope of public works 
was therefore restricted to minimise any detrimental effect they might 
have on the economy and mitigate the level of government investment 
required.
23. Jacques Laffitte, Souvenirs de J. Laffitte: Racontés par lui-même et puisés aux sources les plus 
authentiques (3 vols, Paris, 1844), i. 254.
24. Branda, Le Prix de la gloire, pp. 364–72; M. Bruguière, La Première Restauration et son 
budget (Geneva, 1969), pp. 53–61.
25. F. Démier, La France de la Restauration, 1814–1830: L’Impossible retour du passé (Paris, 
2012), pp. 348–50.
26. Gille, La Banque et le crédit, pp. 109–10.
27. Jacques-Joseph-Guillaume-Pierre de Corbière, Rapport au roi sur la situation, au 31 mars 
1825, des canaux (Paris, 1825), p. 6.
28. G. Nieradzik, ‘La Construction du réseau de canaux français et son financement boursier 
(1821–1868)’, in G. Gallais-Hamonno and P.-C. Hautcoeur, eds., Le Marché financier français au 
XIXe siècle (2 vols, Paris, 2007), ii. 459–506.
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Despite the limited ambitions of the Restoration state, the 
government was criticised for not dismantling the Napoleonic Leviathan 
of bureaucrats and state regulation. In the late 1820s, economic 
liberalism became fashionable among some prominent opponents of 
the regime, who invoked it in their agitation for a smaller state. Thus, 
the July Monarchy was established during the 1830 revolution amid 
pressure for ‘un gouvernement à bon marché’—cheaper government. 
The Orleanists, however, contented themselves with a series of minor 
reforms in the 1830s, which did little to restructure the state as such 
members of the liberal opposition of the 1820s had advocated.29 Indeed, 
the growth of public spending from the late 1830s disregarded the 
preference of economic liberals for a smaller state that would entail 
a minimal infringement of liberty and reduce the taxes that deprived 
individuals of the means to further their own prosperity. For such 
liberals, public works were best left to the private sector.30
II
The Orleanist state was a ‘liberal’ one, but nonetheless rejected these 
inhibitions. In 1831, the ministry of commerce was overhauled, an 
indication of the regime’s willingness to intervene in the economy.31 
Meanwhile, inquiries assessing the ‘public utility’ of proposed public 
works, having already developed during the Restoration, proliferated 
in the early 1830s.32 By the end of the decade, public works were 
starting to be undertaken on a much greater scale, and with a much 
greater financial commitment from the government than during the 
Restoration. In part, this reflected the rise of the ‘social question’—the 
fear of a growing, dispossessed and potentially subversive underclass of 
the poor and unemployed.33 This was no small concern for a regime 
born of revolution, and which itself faced a series of revolutionary 
uprisings in the 1830s. Indeed, the minister of public works, noted 
the holder of the office in 1840, ‘in the time in which we live, is the 
dispenser of grace’.34 The population of Paris grew sharply under the 
July Monarchy, rising from 861,436 in 1831 to 1,226,980 in 1846, probably 
exacerbating social problems in the city.35 During the Restoration, 
29. See P. Harismendy, ed., La France des années 1830 et l’esprit de réforme (Rennes, 2006).
30. F. Démier, ‘Économistes libéraux et “services publics” dans la France du premier XIXe 
siècle’, Revue d’ histoire moderne et contemporaine, lii, no. 3 (2005), pp. 33–50.
31. Todd, Free Trade and Its Enemies, p. 95.
32. F. Graber, ‘Enquêtes publiques, 1820–1830: Définir l’utilité publique pour justifier le 
sacrifice dans un monde de projets’, Revue d’ histoire moderne et contemporaine, lxiii, no. 3 (2016), 
pp. 31–63.
33. On the ‘social question’, see L. Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris 
pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris, 1958); G.  Procacci, Gouverner la misère: La 
Question sociale en France (1789–1848) (Paris, 1993).
34. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Thiers MSS, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises, 
20611, fo. 12, Hippolyte François Jaubert to Adolphe Thiers, 19 Aug. 1840.
35. L. Chevalier, La Formation de la population parisienne au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1950), p. 40.
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the municipality had pursued limited public works and a balanced 
budget.36 In the 1830s, it began to respond to the growth in population 
with new public works, benefiting from the assistance of the central 
government. In 1833, Adolphe Thiers, minister of commerce and public 
works, and one of the architects of the interventionist state, secured 
the passage of the loi des cent millions—100 million francs for public 
works, 24 million of which went to Paris. In 1837, the municipality 
augmented its resources with a loan.37 Public spaces and markets were 
remodelled, and monuments were erected to glorify the regime; the Arc 
de Triomphe was completed in 1836, as was the Colonne de Juillet in 
1840. Meanwhile, in response to both population growth and a cholera 
epidemic in 1832, sanitation was greatly improved. Whereas only 15,000 
metres of sewers were built between 1814 and 1830, from 1832 to 1840, 
62,682 metres were constructed, falling to 27,321 metres in 1841–47 as 
the municipal budget was redirected towards other building projects.38 
The state’s greater involvement in construction in Paris arose partly 
from the fortification of the city between 1841 and 1844, following an 
international crisis in 1840. Like other public works, the fortifications 
may have drawn migrants into the city in search of employment, 
though this is difficult to know for certain. Still, the growth of the 
population was one reason for fortifying the city in the first place, a 
policy supported in some quarters as a means of facilitating military 
control of Paris in the event of unrest.39
Most of the money voted in the loi des cent millions was spent on 
canals and roads. Only 500,000 francs were for ‘études’ to facilitate 
the extension of the railway network, though railway construction 
eventually became the largest category of public works expenditure of the 
July Monarchy. Initially, the state’s involvement in railway construction 
followed the pattern of Restoration canal building: concessions were 
granted to companies of bankers, who then constructed and operated 
the lines. Following this model, the first railway concession was granted 
in 1823, to run between Andrézieux and Saint-Étienne, and the line 
opened in 1828.40 In 1835, the concession for the line between Paris and 
Saint-Germain was awarded to a company of bankers, and the financial 
success of the line when it opened in 1837 stimulated interest in major 
railway investment from the haute banque, the leading Paris banking 
36. S.W. Sawyer, ‘Locating Paris: The Parisian Municipality in Revolutionary France, 1789–
1852’ (Univ. of Chicago Ph.D. thesis, 2008), pp. 219–22; G. Massa-Gille, Histoire des emprunts de 
la ville de Paris (1814–1875) (Paris, 1973), pp. 131–52.
37. Massa-Gille, Histoire des emprunts de la ville de Paris, p. 177; M. Marion, Histoire financière 
de la France depuis 1715 (6 vols, Paris, 1914–31), v. 153–4.
38. G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, Nouvelle histoire de Paris: La Restauration (1815–1830) (Paris, 
1977), p. 89; P. Vigier, Nouvelle histoire de Paris: Paris pendant la monarchie de Juillet (1830–1848) 
(Paris, 1991), p. 203.
39. P. O’Brien, ‘L’Embastillement de Paris: The Fortification of Paris during the July 
Monarchy’, French Historical Studies, ix (1975), pp.  63–82; Chevalier, La Formation de la 
population parisienne, pp. 105, 110.
40. F. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer en France (3 vols, Paris, 1997–2017), i. 84–5.
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houses.41 A series of further concessions was adjudicated in 1838, and, to 
oversee this process and regulate the railway companies, a new ministry 
of public works was established—an indication, like the reform of the 
ministry of commerce in 1831, of the Orleanist regime’s commitment to 
economic interventionism.
The Paris-Saint-Germain railway was a joint-stock enterprise; the 
capital of 5 million francs was raised through 10,000 shares of 500 francs 
divided between four bankers and Émile Pereire, who masterminded the 
operation, and who, with his brother Isaac, did much to further railway 
construction in the 1840s and 1850s.42 Subsequent railway companies 
were funded in the same way as the Paris-Saint-Germain. In 1837, the 
ascent of joint-stock finance continued, as Laffitte created a Caisse 
générale du commerce et de l’ industrie to provide credit for industry and 
commerce.43 This enterprise offered a model for undertaking public 
works without recourse to government money. Léon Faucher, economist 
and deputy of the dynastic opposition in the Chamber,44 argued that 
utilising small investors to capitalise railway companies directly, instead 
of relying solely on the haute banque, meant that far greater resources 
could be mobilised for railway construction.45 While Laffitte’s Caisse 
was regarded suspiciously by some of the haute banque, many accepted 
the principle of joint-stock finance. David Landes demonstrated long 
ago the inaccuracy of the notion that the haute banque uniformly 
opposed the rise of joint-stock banking, and the same was true of the 
government.46 As the Journal des débats, a moderate, liberal newspaper 
that became a de facto government mouthpiece in the 1840s, observed 
in 1838, ‘the government, for its part, wants to develop in France the 
spirit of association, and not to constrain it ... association is both a 
guarantee of order and one of the most precious uses of liberty’.47 Not 
only did joint-stock finance offer an invaluable means of expediting 
railway construction without imposing a heavy burden on the treasury, 
it would enlarge the investing public, increasing the number of people 
with a stake in the social and political order (though in fact most shares 
remained in the hands of wealthy notables).48
41. B.M. Ratcliffe, ‘The Origins of the Paris-St-Germain Railway’, Journal of Transport 
History, i (1972), pp. 197–219.
42. B. Gille, Histoire de la maison Rothschild (2 vols, Geneva, 1965–7), i. 262–3; H.M. Davies, 
Emile and Isaac Pereire: Bankers, Socialists and Sephardic Jews in Nineteenth-Century France 
(Manchester, 2015).
43. Gille, La Banque et le crédit, p. 114.
44. The ‘dynastic’ opposition operated within the constitutional framework of the regime, in 
contrast to the more subversive, radical opposition.
45. Léon Faucher, ‘De la Souscription directe dans les Entreprises de travaux publics’, Revue 
des deux mondes, 1 June 1838.
46. D.S. Landes, ‘Vieille banque et banque nouvelle: La Révolution financière du dix-neuvième 
siècle’, Revue d’ histoire moderne et contemporaine, iii (1956), pp. 204–22.
47. Le Journal des débats, 16 Dec. 1838.
48. A.-J. Tudesq, Les Grands notables en France (1840–1849): Étude d’une psychologie sociale (2 
vols, Paris, 1964), ii. 656–60.
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From the regime’s perspective, railways would facilitate prosperity and 
more effective government by furthering the integration of the national 
space and thus reinforcing the centralisation of the state. Greater 
prosperity would increase tax revenue, while fiscal administration 
would benefit from infrastructural improvements. The minister of 
public works noted in 1838 that the construction of a railway from Paris 
to the port of Le Havre, through which 300,000 tonnes of raw cotton 
and other colonial goods were imported annually, would expedite the 
transport of ‘necessary exotic commodities’ to Paris.49 Railways would 
increase the supply and thus drive down prices, potentially benefiting 
a broad swathe of the population and mitigating the causes of unrest. 
The same logic applied to grain, which had greater ramifications for 
public order. Indeed, the government responded to food riots in 1838–
39 partly by emphasising the need for the free circulation of grain.50 
This depended on the effectiveness of infrastructure, of roads, railways 
and canals. Railway construction could further benefit public order by 
easing the movement of troops into towns and cities, should they be 
needed to quell dissent—as happened in Paris in June 1848.51 Indeed, if 
public works risked aggravating the ‘social question’ by drawing more 
dispossessed migrants into Paris in search of employment, railways, 
like the fortification of the city, could ease the threat these people 
posed by facilitating military repression. They could also expedite the 
deployment of troops to protect France’s borders. Moreover, they were, 
like the building projects in Paris, deemed necessary for the regime’s 
international prestige. As the minister of public works noted in 1842, 
Britain, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands and even ‘the 
smallest German states’ were constructing railways.52 France could not 
afford to fall behind. Railways, therefore, could do much to strengthen 
the regime; given the instabilities that beset nineteenth-century French 
politics, and which were especially pronounced in the 1830s, this was 
no small concern.
The brief railway boom of the late 1830s ended with a financial crisis 
in 1839. Several companies went bankrupt; others found themselves 
overstretched by unexpectedly high costs and pressured the government 
for a solution.53 Beginning with the loi des cent millions, the government 
had asserted its responsibility for railway construction in the 1830s 
but had not incurred major financial obligations. In 1840, this began 
to change, as the government lent money to several companies, and 
guaranteed 4 per cent dividends on the Paris–Orléans line, effective 
49. Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des 
Chambres françaises, 2nd ser. (126 vols, 1862–1912), cxv. 512, 521 (Martin [du Nord], 15 Feb. 1838).
50. J.A. Miller, Mastering the Market: The State and the Grain Trade in Northern France, 
1700–1860 (Cambridge, 1999), p. 282.
51. J. Vidalenc, ‘La Province et les journées de juin’, Études d’ histoire moderne et contemporaine, 
ii (1948), pp. 83–144, at 84, 112–13.
52. Le Moniteur universel, 8 Feb. 1842 (Jean-Baptiste Teste, 7 Feb. 1842).
53. Gille, La Banque et le crédit, pp. 337–46; Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 143–7.
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from the date on which the line became fully operational. The potential 
expense of this promise, though, was attacked as gifting public money 
to avaricious financiers and no further guarantees were offered by the 
Orleanist regime.54
The 1839 crisis had shown the inadequacy of private finance alone 
to construct the French railway network. In 1842, therefore, the 
government unveiled a new plan, proposing to contribute financially 
to the construction of several major trunk lines.55 Local and central 
government would purchase the land, which would then be leased 
to the private companies that would build and operate the lines.56 
However, only a few lines were constructed in the manner outlined by 
the 1842 law. Local government resources were so limited that in 1845 
the requirement that they contribute was rescinded.57 Likewise, the 
central government’s means were constrained, not least by wariness on 
the part of the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. As the 
latter’s rapporteur for the 1842 bill put it, ‘the financial resources of the state 
are not without limits’.58 Private finance, therefore, remained pivotal, and 
thus continued to determine the pace of railway construction; the 1842 
law did not produce an immediate rush for concessions.59 Still, public 
money stimulated private investment by reducing the liabilities railway 
companies faced. Public and private spending on railways consequently 
rose in tandem, reaching a peak in 1845–46.60 This was facilitated by 
a surge in British railway speculation, which was particularly intense 
in 1844–46.61 Before 1841, just over 800 kilometres of concessions were 
adjudicated, while total railway expenditure by the government and 
private investors totalled 274 million francs; between 1841 and 1847, 
the total railway expenditure by the public and private sectors was 793 
million francs, of which 618 million was spent in 1845–47.62
The 1842 railway law, despite the limits to its implementation, 
represented a new conception of the state. As Faucher observed, ‘The 
novelty of this legislative measure, its usefulness and its importance, is 
that it has laid down and proclaimed the principle of union between 
54. Gille, La Banque et le crédit, p. 222; Marion, Histoire financière, v. 200–203.
55. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 148–50.
56. Le Moniteur universel, 8 Feb. 1842 (Teste, 7 Feb. 1842).
57. Y. Leclercq, Le Réseau impossible: La Résistance au système des grandes compagnies ferroviaires 
et la politique économique en France, 1820–1852 (Geneva, 1987), p. 187. Regarding the constraints 
on local government spending, see O. Conrad, Le Conseil général du Haut-Rhin au XIXe siècle: Les 
Débuts d’une collectivité territorial et l’ influence des notables dans l’administration départementale 
(1800–1870) (Strasbourg, 1998), pp. 507, 516–17.
58. Quoted in Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 148.
59. Leclercq, Le Réseau impossible, pp. 185–6.
60. Ibid., pp.  185, 191; Y.  Leclercq, ‘Les Transferts financiers États-compagnies privées de 
chemins de fer d’intérêt général (1833–1908)’, Revue économique, xxxiii (1982), pp. 896–924, at 
899, 902–3.
61. L.H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875 (London, 1927), pp.  128–9, 138–50; 
R.W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, 1825–1875 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 28–48.
62. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 147, 191.
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two rival forces, between the state and private industry.’63 A reluctance 
to embark on large-scale state investment in public works, apparent 
during the Restoration, receded. Between 1830 and 1848, the government 
spent 1,464,415,000 francs on public works, 818,733,970 of which arose 
from the laws and budgetary provisions of 1841 and 1842 (fig. 1).64 This 
assistance was not a free handout. The state obtained free or discounted 
use of the railways—for instance, for the military or the postal service, 
which was state-owned.65 Companies typically had to provide a 
substantial surety and repay the state for any expenses it had incurred. 
The Compagnie du Nord, for example, which operated the concession 
from Paris through Lille to Calais and to the Belgian border, provided 
15 million francs, 11 million of which was to reimburse the state for 
construction of the earthworks required for the railway.66 Furthermore, 
the government, the minister of public works affirmed in 1846, would 
‘oversee the management’ of all railways benefiting from state funds.67 
Thus, following the guarantee of dividends on the Paris–Orléans line, 
all the company’s finances were subjected to government scrutiny from 
1843 onwards.68 Meanwhile, new laws imposed extensive regulation, 
covering, inter alia, fares, routes, dividends, share issues, safety measures 
and the quality of the locomotives.69 Tickets were taxed, as was the 
movement of goods. Most concessions, moreover, were short-term, in 
the range of 25–50 years.70 This, argued Michel Chevalier, the Saint-
Simonian economist, constrained private companies to such an extent 
that the state essentially owned the railways.71 The July Monarchy, 
therefore, did not simply cater to the wishes of the ‘bourgeoisie’, as 
some historians arguing for a more laissez-faire Orleanist state have 
suggested. In offering private investors the promise of profit, the state 
gained significant control over a major public interest.
The close regulation of railway companies was partly designed to 
deflect criticism that the government was facilitating the creation of 
monopolies by powerful special interests. Oversight was also necessary 
to mitigate the moral hazard that joint-stock companies created in 
allowing individuals to avoid personal responsibility for their actions 
by undertaking them in the name of a company. Moreover, since 
joint-stock finance entailed the issue of new securities, regulation was 
63. Léon Faucher, ‘Des projets de loi sur les Chemins de Fer’, Revue des deux mondes, 1 
May 1843.
64. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 232.
65. Leclercq, ‘Les Transferts financiers’, pp. 919–21.
66. F. Caron, Histoire de l’exploitation d’un grand réseau: La Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du 
Nord, 1846–1937 (Paris, 1973), p. 51.
67. Ordonnance du roi portant règlement d’administration publique sur la police, la surêté et 
l’exploitation des chemins de fer: Loi sur la police des chemins de fer, rapport au roi (Paris, 1846), p. 53.
68. Law of 20 Oct. 1843: Recueil général des lois et ordonnances, 13th ser., XIII, pp. 377–9.
69. See, for example, laws of 11 June 1842, 26 July 1844 and 15 July 1845: Recueil général des lois 
et ordonnances, 11th ser., XII, pp. 116–22; 13th ser., XIV, pp. 324–332, and XV, pp. 269–313.
70. Leclercq, ‘Les Transferts financiers’, p. 902.
71. J. Walch, Michel Chevalier: Économiste saint-simonien (Paris, 1975), p. 327.
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intended to ease complaints that the government was encouraging 
speculation and stock-jobbing, which ran the risk of destabilising the 
market and thus the social order.72 Regulation, though, did nothing 
to hinder criticism of the growth of public spending. In 1840, the 
Marquis d’Audiffret, a member of the Chamber of Peers and president 
of the Cour des comptes, published his Système financier de la France.73 
The Restoration, he argued, had stabilised the public finances after 
the calamities of the Revolution and the Empire, lowering taxes and 
borrowing responsibly. While the Orleanist regime had remained 
prudent in the 1830s, he claimed that the rise of government 
expenditure risked undermining the health of the public finances.74 
Most of the regime’s elite were landowners, many of whom regarded 
land as heavily taxed.75 Such men, of whom Audiffret was one, typically 
disliked the notion that they might have to bear a heavier fiscal burden 
to finance railways for the profit of a few elite bankers. Thus, many 
of them regarded warily the Orleanist state’s growing involvement in 
railway finance.
III
Railways were not the only cause of rising public expenditure in the 
1840s. Spending on the army and navy also grew, lending greater force 
to Audiffret’s complaints that government expenditure was too high. 
The military competed for resources with public works, underlining 
the impressiveness of the government’s increased investment in the 
latter, given that military spending could easily be regarded as more 
important. Like public works, the army provided a source of prestige 
for the regime. In 1837, the Musée de Versailles was opened, complete 
with a gallery of paintings commemorating the role of the king’s sons 
on campaign in Algeria.76 Already expensive in the 1830s, Algeria 
became more so during the conquest of the 1840s. Beyond glorifying 
the dynasty, some advocates of the conquest saw in it a potential 
solution to the ‘social question’, since the French poor could migrate 
to become prosperous colonists.77 Colonisation, moreover, would 
72. A. Stanziani, Rules of Exchange: French Capitalism in Comparative Perspective, Eighteenth 
to Early Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge, 2012), pp.  250–53; A.  Lefebvre-Teillard, La Société 
anonyme au XIXe siècle: Du Code de commerce à la loi de 1867, histoire d’un instrument juridique 
du développement capitaliste (Paris, 1985), pp. 22–4.
73. Charles-Louis-Gaston d’Audiffret, Système financier de la France (2 vols, Paris, 1840). 
Established in 1807, the Cour des comptes was charged with overseeing the public accounts.
74. Ibid., i. 199–200.
75. P.L.-R. Higonnet and T.B. Higonnet, ‘Class, Corruption and Politics in the French 
Chamber of Deputies, 1846–1848’, French Historical Studies, v (1967), pp.  204–24; see also 
Tudesq, Les Grands notables en France, i. 429–35.
76. J.E. Sessions, By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca, NY, 2011), pp. 83–124.
77. Ibid., pp. 200–207, 264–89; J. Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in 
Britain and France (Princeton, NJ, 2005).
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facilitate the economic development of Algeria, and would thus reduce 
the costs of sustaining the French presence there. This, however, was 
a distant prospect in the 1840s. From 1836 to 1845, revenue from the 
colony never exceeded 6 per cent of expenditure there, and this fell to 
a low of 3 per cent in 1841–42 as military spending rose.78 For critics of 
the conquest, such costs diverted resources from the public works that 
would improve prosperity in France and strengthen French power and 
prestige in Europe.79 Ultimately, deficits in Algeria amounted to almost 
900 million francs between 1830 and 1848.80
An international crisis over the Near East in the summer of 1840 
stimulated further increases to military and naval spending (fig. 2). In 
1839–40, the French alienated the other Great Powers by supporting the 
Egyptians in their war against the Ottomans. Fearful of an Ottoman 
collapse, in July 1840 the Powers concluded a convention to guarantee 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to which France was merely invited 
to accede. Humiliated, the French mobilised reservists, threatening the 
Powers with a European war. The French ultimately conceded, and 
the fear that France was unprepared for a European war persisted. In 
1841, Thiers, who had headed the government during most of the crisis, 
persuaded the Chambers to resume the fortification of Paris, which 
had stalled since 1833; it was completed in 1844 at a total cost of 145 
million francs.81 The 1840 crisis also increased the impetus for railway 
construction to facilitate the movement of troops and so improve the 
army’s defensive capacity.82 French sensitivity to the slight from the Great 
Powers in 1840 was increased by other European monarchs’ disdain 
for Louis-Philippe as a king crowned by a revolution. Consequently, 
the desire for glory abroad intensified, increasing the pressure both to 
conquer Algeria and to pursue a more global foreign policy.83 The latter 
encouraged the growth of naval expenditure in the mid-1840s, as the 
French sought to capitalise on the innovation of steam power.84
In Paul Kennedy’s words, France was a ‘hybrid power’, with 
naval and terrestrial interests but without the means to pursue these 
simultaneously.85 This problem was rendered more acute by the growing 
pressure for retrenchment. Even before the international crisis, military 
78. M. Douël, Un siècle de finances coloniales (Paris, 1930), pp. 17, 89.
79. Amédée Desjobert, La Question d’Alger: Politique, colonisation, commerce (Paris, 1837), 
pp. 253–7; on Desjobert, see Pitts, A Turn to Empire, pp. 185–9.
80. Douël, Un siècle de finances coloniales, pp. 17, 89, 141.
81. O’Brien, ‘L’Embastillement de Paris’, p. 63.
82. Pierre-Jean-Joseph Lacave-Laplagne, Observations sur l’administration des finances pendant 
le Gouvernement de Juillet, et sur ses résultats, en réponse aux rapports de M. le Ministre des finances 
des 9 mars et 8 mai 1848 (Paris, 1848), pp. 25–6.
83. Pinkney, Decisive Years in France, pp.  128–48; D.  Todd, ‘A French Imperial Meridian, 
1814–1870’, Past and Present, no. 210 (2011), pp. 155–86.
84. C.I. Hamilton, ‘The Diplomatic and Naval Effects of the Prince de Joinville’s Note 
sur L’ état des forces navales de la France of 1844’, Historical Journal, xxxii (1989), pp. 675–87; 
M. Battesti, La Marine de Napoléon III: Une politique navale (2 vols, Vincennes, 1997), i. 46–7.
85. P.M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1989), p. 169.
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expenditure aroused concern, as Audiffret’s book suggests. In February 
1840, one member of the Chamber of Deputies’ budget commission 
condemned military spending as ‘enormous’.86 For advocates of public 
works, railway construction offered a means of reducing military spending 
over the longer term. Chevalier had noted in 1838 that ‘in times of peace, 
it would allow a considerable reduction in the military forces spread across 
the south, because the garrison of Paris would then be simultaneously 
the garrison of Lyon’.87 In expediting the movement of troops, and thus 
improving the defence of France’s borders, railways could potentially 
facilitate reductions in military spending. Moreover, Chevalier believed 
that, in supporting railway construction and so facilitating prosperity, 
the government would acquire greater means to extend French influence 
abroad through non-military means.88 The expansion of the state through 
public works, therefore, could strengthen France’s position as a great power.
IV
The political will for the growth of government spending in the 1840s 
seems to have come from Louis-Philippe himself, from François Guizot, 
the foreign minister and effective leader of the government, and from 
Tanneguy Duchâtel, the interior minister. Indeed, the partnership 
between Guizot and Duchâtel dominated the internal politics of 
the government they both joined in October 1840.89 Within the 
government, though, as among the political elite more broadly, higher 
public spending proved controversial. Jean-Georges Humann, finance 
minister from 1840 to 1842, complained in 1841 that ‘The Country 
... aspires to be powerful everywhere and in all things, externally and 
internally. It wants numerous armies, a formidable navy, roads, canals, 
railways and all this on the condition that we ask it for no subsidies.’90 
Though he supported railway construction, Humann resisted the 
growth of government spending, deeming it fiscally irresponsible.91 
He opposed the fortification of Paris, for instance.92 Unfortunately for 
Humann, his colleagues, not least Guizot and Duchâtel, agreed with 
‘the Country’ in wanting the best of all worlds.
86. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Archives Nationales [hereafter AN], C 803, procès verbaux, 
commission du budget, session de 1840, 27 Feb. 1840.
87. Michel Chevalier, ‘Du Réseau des Chemins de Fer tel qu’il pourrait être établi en France’, 
Revue des deux mondes, 15 Apr. 1838.
88. D. Todd, ‘Transnational Projects of Empire in France, c.1815–c.1870’, Modern Intellectual 
History, xii (2015), pp.  265–93, at 274–7; F.  Taricone, Il Sansimoniano Michel Chevalier: 
Industrialismo e liberalismo (Florence, 2006), pp. 191–3.
89. On the relationship between Guizot and Duchâtel, see R.L. Koepke, ‘Charles Tanneguy 
Duchâtel and the Revolution of 1848’, French Historical Studies, viii (1973), pp. 236–54.
90. AN, Maison de France MSS, 300AP(III)/44, dossier 2, fo. 3, Jean-Georges Humann to 
Louis-Philippe, 13 Aug. 1841.
91. For his approval of railways, see, for example, Archives parlementaires, 2nd ser., cix. 551 
(Humann, 14 Jan. 1836).
92. London, Rothschild Archive [hereafter RA], XI/101/4, de Rothschild frères to N.M. 
Rothschild and Sons, 6 Jan. 1841.
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Historians have tended to regard Guizot as ignorant of, or indifferent 
to, economics.93 In part, this accusation originated with the alleged fiscal 
irresponsibility of his government. In the 1840s, recalled the prominent 
opposition politician Charles de Rémusat, the finance ministry was 
sufficiently unimportant to be ‘abandoned to men of the second or third 
rank’.94 While Humann was not a ‘man of the second or third rank’, 
this description was more applicable to his successors, Jean Lacave-
Laplagne and Sylvain Dumon. However, the limitations of these men 
afforded Guizot and Duchâtel greater control over economic policy. 
Though Guizot’s main focus, as foreign minister, was on international 
relations, he remained active in domestic affairs. The same was true 
of Louis-Philippe, whose principal political interests lay in foreign 
affairs and the military. Certainly, the growth in government railway 
expenditure could not have happened without the support of both 
men. Evidence for their involvement is sparse, though, partly because 
many of the deliberations between Louis-Philippe, Guizot, Duchâtel 
and other ministers over railways were undertaken orally.95 Still, the 
pre-eminence of these three men was occasionally apparent in writing. 
In 1845, Comte Daru presented the Chamber of Peers with a proposal 
to require railway concessionaires to declare their assets and entrust 
these to the Caisse des dépôts et consignations.96 This would reduce the 
risk that the public money invested in railway companies would be 
lost to bankruptcies or speculation, while reassuring the public and 
other investors that a concession was backed by sufficient capital. The 
proposal was criticised as creating a disincentive for joint-stock railway 
finance.97 Fearing that the motion might pass and consequently produce 
a withdrawal of essential British capital, Louis-Philippe summoned 
Guizot and Duchâtel. A reduction in private capital, the king wrote, 
would require the government to commit more of its own resources to 
maintain railway construction.98 The episode reveals Louis-Philippe’s 
commitment to the expansion of railways—preferably by relying on 
93. On Guizot’s attitude to political economy, see P.  Rosanvallon, Le Moment Guizot 
(Paris, 1985), pp.  267–70; D.  Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of French History, 1787–1874 (London, 
1963), pp. 81–2, 230–35; F. Démier, ‘Peut-on parler d’une politique économique de Guizot?’, in 
R. Chamboredon, ed., François Guizot (1787–1874): Passé, présent (Paris, 2010), pp. 93–116.
94. C. de Rémusat, Mémoires de ma vie, ed. C.-H. Pouthas (5 vols, Paris, 1958–67), iv. 12.
95. Thus Guy Antonetti, for example, suggests that Louis-Philippe ‘did not appear personally 
very interested’ in the 1842 railway law: G. Antonetti, Louis-Philippe (Paris, 1994), p. 849.
96. Established in 1816, the Caisse des dépôts et consignations managed a wide array of private 
assets under the supervision of the government, the Banque de France, members of the legislature 
and the president of the Paris Chamber of Commerce.
97. Le Moniteur universel, 16 Feb. 1845 (Napoléon Daru, 15 Feb. 1845); Le Moniteur universel, 
20 Mar. 1845 (report by Teste, 19 Mar. 1845); Le Moniteur universel, 26 Mar.–2 Apr. 1845. Following 
the presentation of Daru’s proposal, Sylvain Dumon, the minister of public works, offered 
no immediate opposition, recommending instead that the Chamber consider it (Le Moniteur 
universel, 16 Feb. 1845 [Dumon, 15 Feb. 1845]); when the proposition was debated, he adopted 
a stance of qualified opposition (Le Moniteur universel, 27 Mar. 1845 [Dumon, 26 Mar. 1845]).
98. AN, Guizot MSS, 42AP/286, Louis-Philippe to François Guizot, 30 Mar. 1845.
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private finance—as well as reflecting the ultimate supremacy of Louis-
Philippe, Guizot and Duchâtel over public works.
Louis-Philippe’s desire to sustain private investment in railways 
reflected the widespread desire to ease the burden on the state by 
harnessing private capital. This would appease opponents of rising 
government expenditure in the Chambers, while also easing the 
pressure to reduce military spending—a major concern of the king’s. 
Though the government accommodated pressure from the Chambers 
to curb the growth of military spending that followed the 1840 crisis, 
Louis-Philippe—like the war ministry—yielded to this reluctantly. 
In 1843, for instance, he instructed his ministers to oppose a ‘fatal 
reduction’ in the military budget.99 As Guizot observed in 1847, in 
response to a request from the incoming governor-general of Algeria 
for more troops, ‘I am well accustomed to fighting against the 
inclination of the Chambers and firmly resolved to continue. But there 
is an insurmountable limit, even in the interests of success.’100 In other 
words, Guizot sought to overcome the Chambers’ parsimoniousness, 
and did so regularly. Unlike Humann, Guizot and Louis-Philippe 
regarded a balanced budget as a secondary consideration: important, 
but subordinate to other concerns. Fiscal equilibrium was not an end in 
itself; rather, public finance existed to serve broader political purposes. 
Borrowing was acceptable for necessary expenditure such as the army 
and public works.
Louis-Philippe and Guizot’s engagement with fiscal questions was 
also apparent in their foreign policy, which entailed the pursuit of 
customs agreements with Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Piedmont, in addition to commercial negotiations with Britain.101 
While Guizot and Louis-Philippe sought these agreements for political 
and not economic reasons, they are hardly indicative of an indifference 
to economics, since their political utility would be at least partly 
dependent on their economic value. The more economically profitable 
a customs agreement between, say, France and Belgium, the more 
politically useful it would become. Customs negotiations, moreover, 
required a detailed understanding, from Louis-Philippe, Guizot and 
others, of the mechanics of the fiscal system and its relationship to the 
economy.102
While foreign policy occupied Guizot and Louis-Philippe, Duchâtel 
oversaw the day-to-day management of domestic affairs. Duchâtel 
had a more substantial background in economics than Guizot, having 
served as minister of agriculture, commerce and public works in 
1834–36 and then as finance minister in 1836–37. His interest in the 
99. AN, Guizot MSS, 42AP/286, Louis-Philippe to Guizot, 19 Apr. 1843.
100. AN, Guizot MSS, 42AP/188, Guizot to Henri, duc d’Aumale, 18 Aug. 1847.
101. S. Mastellone, La Politica estera del Guizot, 1840–1847: L’Unione doganale, la lega 
borbonica (Florence, 1957).
102. AN, Guizot MSS, 42AP/286, Louis-Philippe to Guizot, 25 Sept. 1842.
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subject was apparent in the 1820s, when he had written regularly on 
political economy for Le Globe, a prominent opposition newspaper 
founded in 1824. Here, he had endorsed the economic liberalism then 
in vogue  among some of the government’s opponents, supporting 
retrenchment and a smaller state.103 That Duchâtel did little to promote 
this brand of political economy in the 1840s partly reflects the decline 
of its influence and prominence in public discourse. As early as the 
aftermath of the 1830 revolution, Louis-Philippe, indicating that he 
had no particular zeal for retrenchment, had instructed that the phrase 
‘Gouvernement à bon marché’ should not appear in Le Moniteur, the 
official government newspaper.104 Duchâtel supported the growth of 
the state in the 1840s, and his commitment to the interventionist state 
was apparent during the economic crisis of 1846–47. Faced with rising 
bread prices in Paris following a harvest failure in 1846, he complained 
that the bureaucracy at the ministry of commerce was too committed 
to bakers’ ‘absolute freedom’ to regulate prices properly, an attitude 
which, he complained, risked ‘the most serious disorder’.105
Like their predecessors, Guizot and Duchâtel sought to reconcile 
competing demands on government expenditure, while also trying 
to accommodate pressure for fiscal rectitude. To this end, as the 
1842 railway law suggests, they sought to exploit the resources of 
local government and private finance for public works. Since these 
proved inadequate, however, the government resorted to borrowing. 
As Guizot noted, the government’s guiding principles were ‘New 
spending and useful public works[;] No new taxes.’106 Indeed, no new 
taxes were introduced under Louis-Philippe.107 Instead, benefiting 
from economic growth, the government increased revenue from 
existing indirect taxes—attempts to raise direct taxes produced 
severe resistance.108 To finance the growth of public expenditure, 
three major loans were floated, in 1841, 1844 and 1847.109 The first of 
these, amounting to 150 million francs, was needed to support rising 
military expenditure: the expansion of the army after the 1840 crisis, 
the fortification of Paris and the conquest of Algeria. The second 
loan, of 200 million francs, was contracted to cover both the military 
budget, which remained large despite several cuts after 1841, and the 
surge of railway construction in the mid-1840s. The third and largest 
loan, of 250 million francs, was floated principally to finance a bailout 
103. J.-J. Goblot, La Jeune France libérale: Le Globe et son groupe littéraire, 1824–1830 (Paris, 
1995), pp. 310–22; see also Tanneguy Duchâtel, De la charité, dans ses rapports avec l’ état moral et 
le bien-être des classes inférieures (Paris, 1829).
104. AN, Guizot MSS, 42AP/286, Louis-Philippe to Guizot, n.d. (1830?).
105. Brussels, Archives générales du Royaume, Vendôme-Nemours MSS, I586/72, Tanneguy 
Duchâtel to Louis-Philippe, 14 Aug. 1847.
106. AN, Guizot MSS, 42AP/36, informal private note by Guizot, May 1843.
107. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 229.
108. J.-C. Caron, L’Été rouge: Chronique de la révolte populaire en France, 1841 (Paris, 2002); 
R.L. Koepke, ‘The Loi des patentes of 1844’, French Historical Studies, xi (1980), pp. 398–430.
109. Gille, Histoire de la maison Rothschild, i. 306–10.
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of the railway companies following a financial crisis. Of the three 
loans, therefore, the last was the most innovative, offering a clear 
demonstration of the priorities of the new, interventionist state. For 
this reason, it merits closer consideration.
V
The financial crisis of 1847 arose from the harvest failure of 1846, which 
affected most of Europe. The government responded by removing 
the prohibition on the import of foreign grain, and by encouraging 
municipal authorities to reduce duties on grain.110 However, grain 
imports from Russia, Spain and the United States produced an exodus 
of specie, pushing the Banque de France to raise its discount rate from 4 
per cent to 5 per cent in January 1847.111 Only in December was the rate 
returned to 4 per cent.112 In the meantime, the Banque obtained bullion 
through a loan from the London firm of Barings. This money was then 
repaid when the Russian government, seeking to stimulate French 
purchases of Russian grain, stepped in to buy rentes and so reinforced 
the Banque’s reserves.113 In tightening the money supply, the Banque 
exacerbated the problems the railway companies were already facing as 
a result of the 1846 crisis, since rising food prices had reduced industrial 
demand and curbed the availability of capital. Indeed, by January 
1847, the Lyon–Avignon railway company was close to bankruptcy.114 
Declining to rescue it, the bankers turned to the government, seeking 
either an injection of public money or a prolongation of the concession, 
both of which would boost the potential profitability of the line in the 
longer term and thus make it more attractive to private capital.115 These 
proposals were rejected, and British and Parisian shareholders initiated 
the liquidation of the company in August.116
Public money having been necessary to stimulate private railway 
investment earlier in the decade, it assumed a renewed importance as 
the financial crisis undermined investors’ confidence. The government, 
though, struggled to secure the funds necessary to assist the railway 
companies. The harvest failure of 1846 was a typical subsistence crisis, 
but the financial crash of 1847 was a less familiar phenomenon.117 It seems 
110. P. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie de Juillet (7 vols, Paris, 1884–92), vii. 27.
111. G. Ramon, Histoire de la Banque de France, d’après les sources originales (Paris, 1929), 
pp. 205–6.
112. Ibid., p. 214.
113. Paris, Archives de la Banque de France [hereafter ABF], 1069199521/7, note, ‘Décembre 
1846. Achat de 25 millions de matière d’argent à l’Angleterre’; Ramon, Histoire de la Banque de 
France, pp. 206–10; B. Goujon, Monarchies postrévolutionnaires, 1814–1848 (Paris, 2012), p. 383.
114. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 195.
115. London, Baring Archive [hereafter BA], HC 7.1.363, Hottinguer et Cie to Baring Brothers, 
1 Apr. 1847.
116. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 195.
117. M. Price, The Perilous Crown: France Between Revolutions, 1814–1848 (London, 2007), 
p. 327.
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to have produced two reactions, one in favour of state intervention to 
mitigate its effects, and another in favour of fiscal rectitude. In line with 
landowners’ distaste for spending public money to the profit of railway 
financiers, many deputies disliked the idea of increasing state assistance 
to the railways, reviving the arguments deployed in 1839–40 against 
the idea of guaranteeing dividends. Thus, Laplagne faced fierce and 
widespread criticism when he presented the budget to the Chamber 
of Deputies in January 1847. Lambasted for mismanaging the public 
finances, in May he was replaced by Dumon.118
Like Laplagne, Dumon had to reconcile the pressure for action 
with the demands for fiscal rectitude. Bankers and railway companies 
continued to seek government assistance; the directors of the Paris–
Strasbourg railway company, for example, stressed to the minister of 
public works that inaction would exacerbate the crisis.119 Such concerns 
seem to have ultimately overcome the opposition and reluctance of some 
deputies. In June, Guizot noted: ‘The reaction in favour of continuing 
the works and the arrangements with the Companies becomes clear.’120 
Still, the government’s proposal for a loan of 350 million francs to rescue 
the railway companies remained controversial, and the opposition 
continued to reproach ‘the system of the law of 1842’.121 Under the 
barrage of criticism, Dumon sank towards indecisiveness, increasing 
the control of Guizot and Duchâtel over policy. ‘Dumon wants a 
conversation,’ Guizot wrote to Duchâtel the day after the budget 
passed, ‘between us all, on the foundations of the budget. He is on the 
right track. He spoke wonderfully on the loan, and very usefully for the 
public. He must be encouraged.’122
Though the Chambers approved the budget in August, Dumon 
continued to vacillate. He did not rush to adjudicate the loan, since 
this was the most striking evidence of the government’s alleged 
financial mismanagement. Dumon, wrote the Paris banker Hottinguer 
in September, ‘seems to be as much embarrassed as ever’. He was, 
Hottinguer claimed, considering issuing 100 million of the loan in 
short-term bills, which would allow him to defer adjudicating the rest 
‘until the end of next year’.123 While this idea was quickly dropped 
as unfeasible, the continuing uncertainty over the loan, Hottinguer 
noted, was ‘weighing heavily on the bourse’.124 This was eased when 
the government, to Hottinguer’s surprise, announced on 10 October 
118. François Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l’ histoire de mon temps (8 vols, Paris, 1858–67), 
viii. 37–8.
119. A.-J. Tudesq, ‘La Crise de 1847, vue par les milieux d’affaires parisiens’, Bibliothèque de la 
Révolution de 1848, xix (1956), p. 34.
120. AN, Duchâtel MSS, 2AP/8, dossier 1, fo. 96, Guizot to Duchâtel, 5 June 1847.
121. Le Moniteur universel, 3 July 1847 (Léon Faucher, 2 July 1847).
122. AN, Duchâtel MSS, 2AP/8, dossier 1, fo. 104, Guizot to Duchâtel, 9 Aug. 1847. Duchâtel 
shared Guizot’s assessment: AN, Guizot MSS, 42AP/203, Duchâtel to Guizot, 11 Aug. 1847.
123. BA, HC 7.1.419, Hottinguer et Cie to Baring Brothers, 25 Sept. 1847.
124. BA, HC 7.1.422, Hottinguer et Cie to Baring Brothers, 4 Oct. 1847. Emphasis in the 
original.
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the issue of 250 million francs of rentes, raising investors’ confidence 
in railway shares.125 The loan was adjudicated to the Rothschilds 
in November, on terms negotiated by Dumon and Duchâtel.126 
Meanwhile, the issue of the remaining 100 million was deferred to 1848.
The financial crisis of 1847 thus stimulated the interventionism of 
the Orleanist state. At the same time, the controversy over the loan 
generated new pressure for retrenchment. Economic liberalism, having 
found its political influence waning during the early 1830s, experienced 
a limited revival as the opposition emphasised the need for a smaller 
state. ‘The principal cause of the present trouble,’ wrote the widely-
circulated opposition newspaper Le Constitutionnel, ‘all the world 
knows, is the excess of public works, and the exaggerated number of 
railway concessions.’127 The solution to the economic malaise, claimed 
opposition politicians, lay in reducing the state. ‘In ordinary times, and 
had our finances been well managed,’ Le Constitutionnel continued, 
‘French speculators would have easily been able to acquire the grain 
that has become necessary.’128 Without the financial crisis of 1847, 
itself caused by the growth of the state and mismanagement of the 
public finances, the loan would have been unnecessary. According to 
this logic, in other words, the expansion of the state had perpetuated 
both itself and economic misery. Even the railway construction that 
had justified the growth of the state was destructive, the newspaper 
claimed: ‘haulage partly disappears, stagecoaches fall out of use, small 
businesses move, relay posts are ruined, small towns and villages in 
which one stayed and next to which we only pass today, languish, and 
are depopulated and impoverished’. Though they might deliver future 
prosperity, railways initially ‘cause innumerable sufferings’.129
The pressure to streamline the state was reinforced by a group of 
‘progressive conservatives’, who emerged during the 1846 election 
campaign to promote electoral reform, economic liberalisation and 
cheaper government.130 Though they played only a minor role in the 
financial debates of 1847, their appearance nevertheless reflected the 
growing difficulties of maintaining the expansion of the state initiated 
a decade before. The pressure to downsize the state contributed to 
Dumon’s quandary in 1847. As Le Constitutionnel observed, Dumon 
‘does not know how to solve the problem; the deficit must be covered 
and simultaneously revenues must be reduced’.131 While the 1847 loan 
125. Le Moniteur universel, 10 Oct. 1847; BA, HC 7.1.426, Hottinguer et Cie to Baring Brothers, 
11 Oct. 1847; RA, XI/109/64A/1, Nathaniel Rothschild to his brothers, 14 Oct. 1847.
126. Gille, Histoire de la maison Rothschild, i. 309; RA, XI/109/64B/2, Nathaniel Rothschild to 
his brothers, n.d. (Oct.–Nov. 1847).
127. Le Constitutionnel, 5 Aug. 1847.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. R.L. Koepke, ‘The Short, Unhappy History of Progressive Conservatism in France, 1846–
1848’, Canadian Journal of History, xviii (1983), pp. 187–216.
131. Le Constitutionnel, 10 Aug. 1847.
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represented the apogee of the interventionist Orleanist state, the ensuing 
debate over the purposes and the size of the state created new demands 
for retrenchment—and contributed to a reconfiguration of the state 
following the overthrow of the July Monarchy in the revolution of 
February 1848.
VI
The reductions in public expenditure that followed the 1848 revolution 
lasted for the duration of the Second Republic, and a desire to maintain 
fiscal equilibrium continued under the Second Empire. Similar 
pressures for a smaller state were apparent in Britain. In 1842, Sir Robert 
Peel reintroduced income tax as a temporary measure intended to ease 
the rebalancing of the British fiscal system towards lower taxes of a wide 
incidence and thus of a high yield. Though initially attacked by some 
liberal economists, who regarded it as a means of potentially increasing 
the size of the state, the income tax was soon regarded as a pillar of 
free trade and a smaller state. It reduced the government’s reliance on 
indirect taxes, which were criticised for their lack of transparency and 
the burden they placed on industry, and it facilitated the abolition of the 
protectionist Corn Laws in 1846.132 This produced what has been called a 
‘laissez-faire’ state or, perhaps more appropriately, a ‘delegating-market’ 
state.133 In France, while the fiscal system was not recast, elements of 
what might be called a delegating-market state emerged in the 1850s, 
as the interventionist Orleanist state was reshaped. While government 
spending continued to grow, it became more concentrated on the 
military. Though the regime maintained the Orleanist commitment to 
ensuring bread remained affordable, these costs, as in 1846–47, were 
transferred to local government wherever possible.134 Meanwhile, the 
pressure for retrenchment was accommodated by delegating public 
works to the private sector, which, partly at the government’s instigation, 
was transformed through the extension of joint-stock finance.
The further expansion of the state after the 1848 revolution 
exacerbated the already considerable demands for cuts to public 
spending. On 26 February, the day after the Second Republic was 
established, the provisional government decreed the creation of 
National Workshops to provide work for the unemployed. Work, 
the radicals believed, was an entitlement, to be guaranteed by the 
state.135 By contrast, many moderates and conservatives regarded the 
132. M. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914 
(Cambridge, 2001), pp. 78–90.
133. P. Harling and P. Mandler, ‘From “Fiscal-Military” State to Laissez-Faire State, 1760–1850’, 
Journal of British Studies, xxxii (1993), pp. 44–70; Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, p. 26.
134. Miller, Mastering the Market, pp. 286–90; Marion, Histoire financière, v. 359.
135. D.C. McKay, The National Workshops: A  Study in the French Revolution of 1848 
(Cambridge, MA, 1933), pp. 9–13.
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National Workshops suspiciously, seeing in them a means of spreading 
subversive ideas and of undermining the willingness of the poor to seek 
employment independently of the state.136 A general election in April 
resulted in victory for the moderates and conservatives. In June, the 
Workshops were suddenly closed, prompting the uprising from the 
Parisian left known as the June Days. This was quelled, and a new 
moderate republican government was established.
The expansion of the state apparent in the National Workshops 
created new problems of public finance. Already fragile, the markets 
plunged when the July Monarchy collapsed. 5 per cent rentes, having 
been at 116.55 (that is, 116.5 per cent of the nominal value of the bonds) 
on the eve of the February revolution, sank to a low of 50.5 in April.137 
Thus, investors recoiled when the provisional government sought 
to borrow the 100 million that remained of the loan of 1847.138 The 
financial crisis that followed the February revolution made it impossible 
to continue the Orleanist practice of relying on credit to finance the 
expansion of the state. Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, the finance 
minister, therefore resorted to taxation to fund the Republic’s social 
programme. On 16 March, he decreed the notorious ‘45 centimes’, 
a temporary 45 per cent surtax on all direct taxes.139 This provoked 
fierce resistance across the country, particularly in the wine-growing 
regions in the south-west, where the 45 centimes exacerbated existing 
discontent with alcohol duties.140 In raising direct instead of indirect 
taxes, Garnier-Pagès sought to initiate a rebalancing of the fiscal 
system towards more progressive taxation. To achieve this, while also 
seeking to prevent unrest, he announced that the 45 centimes would 
be reduced for the poor.141 This, however, aroused fresh opposition 
from the right, for whom the taxation was a means of raising money, 
not of social engineering. Moreover, despite Garnier-Pagès’s intention, 
the reductions were often seen as insufficient, and thus exacerbated 
unrest.142
To explain the implosion of public credit, the need for the 45 
centimes and the Republic’s failure to create a utopia, Garnier-Pagès 
emphasised—and exaggerated considerably—the precariousness of the 
136. Ibid., pp. 81–104; F. Dreyfus, L’Assistance sous la Seconde République (1848 à 1851) (Paris, 
1907), pp.  50–66; see also R. Price, ‘Poor Relief and Social Crisis in Mid-Nineteenth Century 
France’, European History Quarterly, xiii (1983), pp. 423–54.
137. Le Moniteur universel, 22 Feb. and 6 Apr. 1848.
138. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 241–2, 261.
139. Ibid., v. 245.
140. R. Gossez, ‘La Résistance à l’impôt: Les Quarante-cinq centimes’, Bibliothèque de la 
Révolution de 1848, xv (1953), pp. 89–132.
141. Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, Histoire de la Révolution de 1848 (8 vols, Paris, 1861–2), viii. 
341; Marion, Histoire financière, v. 246.
142. Proposed reductions stimulated fresh unrest in the département of Basses-Alpes, for 
example: AN, BB18 1462, procureur, Digne, to the procureur général, Aix-en-Provence, 28 
Oct. 1848.
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finances that the Republic had inherited from the July Monarchy.143 
Echoing the opposition of 1847, he attacked the Orleanist regime of the 
1840s as fiscally irresponsible. Conservatives, meanwhile, maintained 
the critique of Orleanist finances they had developed from the late 
1830s onwards; in 1848, Audiffret published a pamphlet criticising the 
Orleanists’ management of the public finances after 1841.144 The fiscal 
legacy of the July Monarchy was thus attacked on both the left and 
the right. While several Orleanists, including Laplagne and Dumon, 
published defences of their stewardship of the public finances, they did 
not deny the dire state of the financial situation in 1848; rather, they 
blamed the republicans for the deterioration.145 The trouble affecting 
the public finances was universally acknowledged and was deemed to 
be evident in the fall of the rente and the disorder caused by the 45 
centimes. As a result, pressure for retrenchment became overwhelming.
Though the suppression of the June Days curtailed the power of 
the left, the moderate republicans did little to cut public expenditure 
thereafter. Rather, the new government pursued a programme of social 
reform, aimed at easing the ‘social question’.146 Michel Goudchaux, 
who succeeded Garnier-Pagès, continued the latter’s attempts to 
develop a more progressive fiscal system, though without success.147 
While public credit improved following the radicals’ defeat in June, the 
maintenance of public expenditure induced the government to retain 
the 45 centimes, which did much to compromise the legitimacy of the 
Republic.148 Pledges to abolish these taxes had formed a major part of 
the April election campaign, and promises to reimburse them featured 
prominently in the subsequent elections of 1848 and 1849.149
Elected president in December 1848, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte 
appealed to moderates and conservatives, promising retrenchment and 
fiscal stability.150 A series of spending cuts ensued (figs. 1 and 2). Raised 
to 421,182,774 francs in 1848 by the need to quell disorder and ensure 
143. Le Moniteur universel, 9 May 1848 (Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, 8 May 1848); Marion, 
Histoire financière, v.  239; A.  Antony, La Politique financière du Gouvernement provisoire, 
février–mai 1848 (Paris, 1910), pp. 26–8.
144. Charles-Louis-Gaston d’Audiffret, La Crise financière de 1848 (Paris, 1848).
145. Lacave-Laplagne, Observations sur l’administration des finances pendant le Gouvernement 
de Juillet; Sylvain Dumon, ‘De l’équilibre des budgets sous la monarchie de 1830’, Revue des deux 
mondes, 15 Sept. 1849.
146. F.A.  de Luna, The French Republic Under Cavaignac, 1848 (Princeton, NJ, 1969), 
pp. 248–67.
147. See R. Schnerb, ‘Les Hommes de 1848 et l’impôt’, in J. Bouvier and J. Wolff, eds., Deux 
siècles de fiscalité française, XIXe–XXe siècle (Paris, 1973), pp.  105–57. In February to June, 13.5 
million francs were spent on the National Workshops; from July to December central and local 
government combined spent 13 million on poor relief in Paris: Luna, French Republic Under 
Cavaignac, p. 272.
148. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 274–9; A. Corbin, Le Village des cannibales (Paris, 1990), 
pp. 31–46.
149. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 247.
150. A.-J. Tudesq, L’Élection présidentielle de Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, 10 décembre 1848 
(Paris, 1965); Élection de Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, président de la République Française élu par 
le peuple et proclamé par l’Assemblée nationale, le 20 décembre 1848 (Paris, 1849), p. 32.
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border security, military expenditure fell from 374,762,355 francs in 1849 
to 327, 418,353 in 1852. The navy budget, too, was cut from 124,646,816 
francs in 1848 to 86,556,793 in 1852. Meanwhile, public works spending 
fell from 216,045,163 in 1848 to 120,319,077 francs in 1852.151 In 1853, 
the ministry of public works was amalgamated with that of agriculture 
and commerce. Initially, the retrenchment was overseen by Hippolyte 
Passy, who became finance minister after Louis-Napoleon’s election 
and had previously served as finance minister during the 1840 crisis. 
The cuts were continued by Achille Fould, a former banker who had 
been prominent among the advocates of fiscal rectitude in 1847, and 
who succeeded Passy in October 1849.152 The retrenchment to some 
extent reflected the reversion of the state to its pre-Orleanist role, in 
which public works were to be largely left to the private sector—at 44.3 
per cent, the reduction in public works spending was more severe than 
that in the army (22.3 per cent) or navy (30.6 per cent) budgets.
Government borrowing to finance public works, seen as partly 
responsible for the financial crises of 1847–48, had become inadmissible. 
This attitude was apparent in the solution to the railway question, 
which the crash of 1848 had exacerbated. In May 1848, the provisional 
government had proposed to nationalise the railways, which would 
address the financial problems facing the companies while also removing 
a public service from private ownership.153 Opposed by moderates and 
conservatives, this plan was scrapped after the June Days. Instead, from 
1849 the government instigated a series of mergers.154 Private finance, 
instead of the state, was to save the railway companies. Whereas under 
the July Monarchy 28.7 per cent of railway spending came from the 
state, this fell to 8.9 per cent under the Second Empire.155 To lubricate 
private finance, the government, beginning in 1851, provided a series 
of dividend guarantees, though under terms stipulating that any 
advances made by the state would be repaid at 3–4 per cent interest.156 
Meanwhile, the Banque de France ceased to seek a fixed discount rate 
of 4 per cent, which had determined its policy under previous regimes. 
The relatively high rate of 4 per cent suited the haute banque; they 
rarely borrowed from the Banque de France, while high interest rates 
boosted the bankers’ profits. As a result, the logic ran, French banks 
were better able to support public credit.157 In March 1852, however, 
the discount rate was cut to 3 per cent, while the government converted 
151. Projet de loi portant règlement définitif du budget de l’exercice 1848 (Paris, 1850); Projet 
de loi portant règlement définitif du budget de l’exercice 1849 (Paris, 1851); Projet de loi portant 
règlement définitif du budget de l’exercice 1852 (Paris, 1854).
152. Le Moniteur universel, 23 June 1847 (Achille Fould, 22 June 1847); F. Barbier, Finance et 
politique: La Dynastie des Fould, XVIIIe–XXe siècle (Paris, 1991), pp. 147–56.
153. Leclercq, Le Réseau impossible, pp. 202–6.
154. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 206–31; L. Girard, La Politique des travaux publics du 
Second Empire (Paris, 1952), pp. 88–97.
155. Leclercq, ‘Les Transfers financiers’, p. 899.
156. Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 207, 235–8.
157. A. Plessis, La Politique de la Banque de France de 1851 à 1870 (Paris, 1985), pp. 93–4.
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5 per cent rentes to 4.5 per cent and 3 per cent.158 The fall in interest 
rates stimulated the private capital market, as did the influx of money 
following the discovery of gold in California and Australia, facilitating 
the growth of joint-stock banking and the ‘great boom’ of the 1850s.159
To further economic development, the government approved the 
foundation of the Crédit foncier of Paris in March 1852.160 Largely 
conceived in the 1840s by the liberal economist Louis Wolowski, the 
Crédit foncier was established to improve credit for smallholders, and, 
from 1860 onwards, the bank became a major creditor to municipal 
governments, as they sought to finance urban renovations.161 The 
rebuilding of Paris intensified, developing the work of the July Monarchy, 
while towns and cities across France were rebuilt.162 In supporting 
urban renewal, the Crédit foncier, alongside new tax revenues for local 
government, reflected the central government’s desire to ease pressure 
on its budget by encouraging local government to play a greater role in 
public works.163 A few months after the foundation of the Crédit foncier, 
the government authorised the creation of the Crédit mobilier by the 
Pereire brothers, the banker Benoît Fould and several other members 
of the haute banque as a joint-stock operation to finance industry and 
commerce.164 From the mid-1850s, the Crédit mobilier embarked on an 
intense competition with the Rothschilds for railway concessions across 
Europe, doing much to develop the French—and European—railway 
network in the process.165 With the advent of universal suffrage in 1848, 
and the continuing importance of the ‘social question’, the pressure 
for public works became, if anything, more intense than during the 
1840s. In the 1850s, however, the growth of joint-stock finance and the 
158. Ibid., pp. 99–105.
159. On the ‘great boom’, see E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848–1875 (London, 1975), 
pp. 29–47.
160. This company styled itself the ‘Banque foncière de Paris’, until it became the Crédit 
foncier de France in December 1852. The decree authorising the foundation of the company, 
however, does not use the name ‘Banque foncière de Paris’; as the governor of the Banque de 
France protested, it was not technically entitled to refer to itself as a ‘bank’: ABF, 1069200401/293, 
Antoine d’Argout to Jean-Martial Bineau, 8 Sept. 1852.
161. J.-P. Allinne, Banquiers et bâtisseurs: Un siècle de Crédit foncier, 1852–1940 (Paris, 1984), 
pp.  28–35, 59–80; Girard, La Politique des travaux publics du Second Empire, pp.  261–6. On 
Wolowski, see M. Lutfalla, ‘Louis Wolowski ou le libéralisme positif ’, Revue d’ histoire économique 
et sociale, liv (1976), pp. 169–84.
162. D.H. Pinkney, Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris (Princeton, NJ, 1958); J. Gaillard, 
Paris, la ville (1852–1870) (Paris, 1976); W.B. Cohen, Urban Government and the Rise of the French 
City: Five Municipalities in the Nineteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 222–3.
163. Marion, Histoire financière, v.  326; Conrad, Le Conseil général du Haut-Rhin au XIXe 
siècle, pp. 514, 516–18.
164. B. Gille, La Banque en France au XIXe siècle: Recherches historiques (Geneva, 1970), 
pp. 126–43. Despite historians’ emphasis on the role of the Pereire brothers, Fould was the main 
architect of the Crédit mobilier: J. Greenfield, ‘Le Crédit mobilier avant la suprématie des Pereire’, 
Histoire, économie et société, ii (2020), forthcoming.
165. Gille, Histoire de la maison Rothschild, ii. 183–216; R.E. Cameron, France and the 
Economic Development of Europe, 1800–1914: Conquests of Peace and Seeds of War (Princeton, NJ, 
1961); N. Ferguson, The World’s Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild (London, 1998), 
pp. 564–74, 592–600; Caron, Histoire des chemins de fer, i. 210–35.
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abundance of capital facilitated large-scale public works without major 
injections of government money.
Despite the more effective mobilisation of private capital, the expansion 
of the state did not cease in the 1850s. Public spending fell during the 
Second Republic, but began to grow again in 1853 as the government 
sought to contain the effects of poor harvests. In the following year, the 
Crimean War produced a surge of military and naval expenditure.166 
Indeed, with the greater role private finance played in financing public 
works, the state acquired an increased capacity to fund the army and navy. 
Like Louis-Philippe, Louis-Napoleon was committed to maintaining the 
military expenditure that was essential for his hopes of enhancing France’s 
prestige abroad. Both rulers were committed to public works; in the 1840s, 
Louis-Napoleon had endorsed the idea of government intervention in the 
economy to benefit society.167 Once in power, the extension of public works 
suited his aim of retaining broad popular support—the state could claim 
credit for furthering the public good, while the opening of railway stations, 
hospitals and other public buildings offered excellent opportunities for 
good publicity.168 Though Louis-Napoleon’s political views are notoriously 
difficult to fix with any certainty, it is unlikely that the retrenchment of the 
Second Republic reflected an aversion to government spending on public 
works. Odilon Barrot, the leader of Louis-Napoleon’s first government, 
recalled the difficulties in passing the 1849 budget that arose from reconciling 
‘the constant demands of the president and the parsimoniousness of the 
Assembly’.169 Rather, given the caution of his politics during the late 1840s 
and 1850s, Louis-Napoleon’s acceptance of retrenchment after 1848 probably 
reflected a desire to retain the support of moderate conservatives and liberal 
opponents of government spending. In this context, the development of 
private finance through such institutions as the Crédit mobilier had a natural 
appeal. In delivering public works, these would reduce the pressure on the 
state budget, potentially mitigating criticisms of the kind levelled against 
the Orleanists in the 1840s while easing higher military expenditure. Only 
in the 1860s, when economic malaise hindered the private sector’s ability to 
mobilise the resources required, did government spending on public works 
grow to match the level reached in the 1840s (fig. 1).170
166. Fontvieille, Évolution et croissance de l’État, pp. 1746–7, 2112–13.
167. Napoléon-Louis Bonaparte, Des idées napoléoniennes (Paris, 1839); Napoléon-Louis 
Bonaparte, Extinction du paupérisme (Paris, 1844); P.  Rosanvallon, La Démocratie inachevée: 
Histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en France (Paris, 2000), pp.  203–5. See also E.  Anceau, 
Napoléon III: Un Saint-Simon à cheval (Paris, 2008), pp. 351–63.
168. M. Truesdell, Spectacular Politics: Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and the Fête Impériale, 
1849–1870 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 81–100; R. Dalisson, Les Trois couleurs, Marianne et l’empereur: 
Fêtes libérales et politiques symboliques en France, 1815–1870 (Paris, 2004), pp. 237–41.
169. Odilon Barrot, Mémoires posthumes de Odilon Barrot (4 vols, Paris, 1875–6), iii. 179.
170. Girard, La Politique des travaux publics sous le Second Empire, pp. 103, 351–5. Whereas public 
works spending reached a peak under the Orleanists of 119 million francs in 1846, only once in the 
1850s did it pass 90 million francs, when it rose to 96 million in 1854. Thereafter, spending grew from 
77 million francs in 1859 to 92 million the following year and, in 1861, to 115 million, reaching a peak 
of 126 million francs in 1868: Fontvieille, Évolution et croissance de l’État, pp. 2111–15.
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The state’s renewed capacity for military spending following the 
delegation of public works to private finance was apparent during the 
Crimean War. As with most of the spending increases of the 1840s, the 
war was financed through three major loans of 250 million, 500 million 
and 750 million francs floated in 1854 and 1855.171 The government 
opted to issue these loans by public subscription, departing from the 
model copied from the British after 1815. Thus, instead of contracting 
the loan with bankers—who in the 1840s were the Rothschilds and 
their associates—the government allowed members of the public 
to subscribe directly, benefiting from the emergence of rentiers in 
provincial France under the July Monarchy and the Second Republic 
by issuing rentes beyond Paris, while also seeking to broaden the 
number of these investors with an interest in the regime’s survival.172 
Loans had been issued by public subscription before, but those of 
1854–55 were of an unprecedented scale.173 Indeed, though this shift 
towards public subscription potentially allowed the state to access a 
deeper capital market, it borrowed so much to finance the war that it 
competed with the private sector for resources—which in turn reduced 
the private sector’s capacity to undertake public works.174 In late 1855, 
the government, seeking to retain access to credit without overstraining 
capital markets and thus driving up interest rates, prohibited a share 
issue by the Crédit mobilier that would have doubled its capital.175 
Then, in March 1856, the government issued a general prohibition on 
the issuing of new securities until the end of the year, reflecting the 
fear that peace—formally concluded at the end of the month—would 
unleash a wave of speculation that could overstretch the market and 
provoke a financial crisis.176 While railway companies’ needs for funds 
rendered the ban unsustainable, the government continued to resist 
new issues.177 James de Rothschild was forced to abandon plans to 
improve credit for railway companies through the formation of a new 
joint-stock enterprise.178 Despite the greater delegation of public works 
to the private sector, the government, like its Orleanist predecessor, 
retained significant influence, granting or withholding both railway 
concessions and permission to issue shares.
The growth of public spending in the 1850s provoked criticism, just 
as it had under Louis-Philippe. The ‘authoritarian Empire’ established 
in 1852 reduced the legislature’s power over the budget; in the 1840s, 
171. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 364–7.
172. Ibid., v. 364–5.
173. The government had opened public subscriptions in 1818, 1831 and 1848. Only that of 1818, 
for 14.6 million francs, had fulfilled the government’s needs.
174. André Gueslin suggests that public borrowing crowded out private finance and ‘productive 
investment’ until the 1880s: L’État, l’ économie et la société française, p. 81.
175. Gille, Histoire de la maison Rothschild, ii. 196–200.
176. Le Moniteur universel, 9 Mar. 1856.
177. Gille, La Banque en France au XIXe siècle, p. 149.
178. Gille, Histoire de la maison Rothschild, ii. 208–11.
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the Chambers approved individual chapters of the budget, but in 1852 
this practice was modified so that the Corps législatif merely voted 
on the budgets of entire ministries.179 Moreover, the Corps législatif 
was smaller and, partly as a result, tamer than the Orleanist Chamber 
of Deputies. Consequently, the regime seemed to lack transparency, 
which encouraged some critics to claim, probably unjustly, that under 
the Empire ‘our finances have not been managed in a manner that is 
sensible, regular and profitable for the future’.180 In 1868, Jules Ferry 
famously attacked Haussmann, the prefect of the Seine from 1852 
to 1870, for dishonesty in managing the Parisian municipal budget, 
echoing the criticisms made of the regime since the 1850s. Though 
Ferry’s claims were exaggerated, his Comptes fantastiques d’Haussmann 
became a cause célèbre.181 Other accusations that the public finances 
were being mismanaged were similarly hollow.182 Still, allegations of 
fiscal irresponsibility allowed Fould to resume the finance ministry 
in 1861 almost as a latter-day Necker; Fould’s carefully cultivated 
reputation for fiscal rectitude, Napoleon III hoped, would pacify the 
doubters.183
Despite the criticism, Bonapartist political economy had considerable 
success. The public works of the July Monarchy were extended and 
increased, while the government’s encouragement of joint-stock 
finance eased the burden they placed on the treasury, in an attempt 
to accommodate the critics of Orleanist government spending. Private 
finance would undertake the industrialisation to provide the wealth 
necessary to alleviate social malaise, which would not require the great 
expansion of the state dreaded by many liberals and conservatives. In 
this respect, the means by which the Bonapartists sought to finance 
public works arose in response to the political economy of the July 
Monarchy, and the state was recast in the process.
VII
France was transformed under the July Monarchy, with the rise of the 
interventionist Orleanist state. Crucially, public works emerged as a 
major item of government expenditure. As Laplagne recalled in 1848, 
‘The ministry of public works acquired a greater importance by the 
179. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 351–2.
180. Jean-Baptiste Rosario Gonzalve de Nervo, Les Finances de la France sous le règne de 
Napoléon III (2nd edn, Paris, 1861), p. 6. Nervo, a receiver general who in the 1860s published 
a financial history of the Restoration, defended the Second Empire’s stewardship of the public 
finances.
181. Jules Ferry, Comptes fantastiques d’Haussmann: Lettre adressée à MM. les membres de la 
Commission du Corps législatif chargés d’examiner le nouveau projet d’emprunt de la ville de Paris 
(Paris, 1868); Pinkney, Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris, pp. 174, 200–201.
182. Marion, Histoire financière, v. 360–62.
183. Barbier, Finance et politique, pp.  196–221; Girard, La Politique des travaux publics du 
Second Empire, pp. 269–75.
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day. In 1829, it was merely an administration, no doubt very important, 
but dependent on the ministry of the interior; today, it is one of the 
most considerable: this is what explains the bigger expense of the central 
administration.’184 The expansion of the state was most striking in the 
construction of railways, which was intended to facilitate the administrative 
centralisation of France, to meet the needs of the military and to further 
economic development. In Paris, meanwhile, the central government 
extended its involvement in the municipality’s affairs to instigate the 
rebuilding of the city which intensified under the Second Empire.
In furthering economic development, this new, more interventionist 
state would raise tax revenue and strengthen France as a great power. 
Railways, moreover, would enhance public order by increasing the 
availability of necessities such as grain and thus mitigating the causes of 
unrest, while facilitating the movement of troops to areas where disorder 
was not forestalled. Likewise, though the fortification of Paris may have 
enlarged a potentially subversive urban underclass, the fortifications 
themselves were expected to ease the military repression of unrest. As 
with railways, these public works were partly intended to facilitate the 
preservation of order. Meanwhile, the moral and financial risks that 
arose from joint-stock railway companies were to be controlled by a 
wave of new regulation—though not all the adverse effects of railways, 
such as the decline of stagecoaches and staging posts, could be contained 
by regulation. Even if the greater prosperity that railway construction 
was supposed to produce did not necessarily penetrate all of society, it 
was meant to strengthen the regime by increasing the number of people 
with investments and a consequent interest in maintaining political 
stability. When Guizot notoriously responded to pressure to extend the 
franchise with the words ‘enrichissez-vous’ (‘enrich yourselves’), this 
was not a mere injunction, but rather reflected the government’s aim 
of social and economic improvement for the sake of preserving the 
political order, as the context of Guizot’s speech made clear: ‘found 
your government, affirm your institutions, enlighten yourselves, enrich 
yourselves, ameliorate the moral and material condition of our France; 
these are the real innovations; these are what will satisfy this ardour 
of movement, this need for progress that characterises this nation’.185 
Greater prosperity would, he hoped, reduce the pressure for drastic 
electoral reform, in part by gradually allowing more Frenchmen to 
meet the tax qualification for the franchise.
In addition to improving prosperity, public works were to further 
enhance the legitimacy of the regime by raising French prestige. Paris was 
to be rebuilt to glorify the regime, while the government also sought to 
ensure that France did not fall behind other countries in the construction 
184. Lacave-Laplagne, Observations sur l’administration des finances pendant le Gouvernement 
de Juillet, pp. 98–9.
185. Le Moniteur universel, 2 Mar. 1843 (Guizot, 1 Mar. 1843).
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of a railway network, particularly given the potential military utility of 
railways. At the same time, the army offered a more traditional option 
for enhancing French prestige. Heightened military spending increased 
France’s capacity to act as a great power, and was necessary to facilitate 
the conquest of Algeria, which potentially offered a solution to the ‘social 
question’ through colonisation. Unlike military and naval expenditure, 
public works might in theory have been delegated to the private sector to 
a greater extent—as they were during the Restoration and the early 
Second Empire. However, large-scale railway construction strained 
private finance, even with the development of joint-stock finance from 
the mid-1830s. Not until the 1850s, assisted by falling interest rates, the 
economic boom and ministers’ encouragement, did the private sector 
mobilise sufficient resources to reduce significantly the need for public 
money. In the meantime, the state supported private investment. The 
government guaranteed railway companies in 1840 and in the 1850s, 
while the 1842 railway law postulated a system of partnerships between 
public and private finance.
State expenditure on railways, however, relied on loans, which proved 
controversial, particularly during the financial crisis of 1847. Many 
deputies were landowners and, while appreciating the benefits of railway 
construction, they were wary of gifting public money to financiers. The 
1842 law, the symbol of the state’s expansion, was criticised; the loans 
it entailed were attacked as fiscally irresponsible, and this discourse 
gained greater influence in 1847 and after the 1848 revolution. Thus, the 
Bonapartists oversaw a series of sharp cuts in government spending, and 
the private sector assumed a greater role in financing public works. The 
growing pressure for retrenchment in 1847–48 emulated the hopes raised 
by the 1830 revolution for cheaper government. After 1848, the Bonapartists 
did more to fulfil such hopes than the Orleanists had after 1830. Not until 
the 1860s, when an economic slowdown hindered the private sector’s 
capacity to undertake public works, did the Second Empire revive the 
Orleanist state’s policy of expenditure on public works. Indeed, despite his 
reputation for fiscal probity, Fould reluctantly presided over the continued 
growth of government spending in the 1860s.
The Orleanists, therefore, initiated a lasting expansion of the French 
state; the contraction that followed the 1848 revolution was only 
temporary. Historians have generally underappreciated the significance 
of the July Monarchy in this regard, emphasising the regime’s supposed 
tendency towards laissez-faire. While the economic interventionism 
of the Second Empire and Third Republic may have appeared more 
dramatic and, certainly in the case of the latter, occurred on a greater 
scale, the surge in public works spending under the July Monarchy 
without doubt initiated a new phase in the state interventionism that 
has been a defining feature of French economic history.
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